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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Forget hard cases: bad cases make bad law. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Bauman, which never should have been filed in a California 
federal court, has the potential to make very bad law. It is a 
paradigmatic example of egregious forum shopping that stretches 
jurisdictional doctrines beyond their limits. And, like other acts of 
overreaching by overzealous plaintiffs’ attorneys,1 it is likely to come 
back to haunt not only these plaintiffs but other less manipulative 
plaintiffs in the future. 
II. WHY CALIFORNIA? 
The facts of the case cry out for justice, but it is hard to see why 
that justice should be meted out by any American court, much less one 
in California. Plaintiffs are victims of the “Dirty War” in Argentina, 
and allege that Mercedes-Benz Argentina (“MBA”), a wholly owned 
Argentine subsidiary of the German automaker DaimlerChrysler, 
collaborated with the Argentine state security forces in acts of torture, 
 
   Herman O. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. 
 1. See Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
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kidnapping, and murder.2 Plaintiffs presumably chose to sue 
DaimlerChrysler rather than MBA because of deeper pockets and a 
broader range of possible venues in which to file suit. Most people—at 
least people who are not lawyers—would assume that such a suit 
should be filed in Argentina, of which MBA and all but one of the 
plaintiffs are citizens (one plaintiff is a citizen of Chile)3 and where the 
horrific actions took place, or in Germany, where DaimlerChrysler is 
incorporated and has its primary headquarters. The United States 
and its courts would seem to have no interest in the case or any of the 
parties. 
Even assuming that the United States, in addition to acting as 
“cops of the world,”4 can also serve as judicial arbiter for the world, the 
most plausible U.S. venue for the suit is Michigan, where 
DaimlerChrysler has maintained a second set of headquarters since it 
was formed as a result of the 1998 merger between the German 
company Daimler-Benz and Michigan-based Chrysler.5 Indeed, the 
plaintiffs served process on DaimlerChrysler at its Michigan 
headquarters.6 And because the suit includes claims under two U.S. 
federal statutes—the Alien Tort Statute7 and the Torture Victims 
Protection Act of 19918—the United States has at least a presumptive 
interest in the suit, and bringing suit in Michigan is arguably 
justifiable.9 
Given all this information, if a thousand people were asked 
where this suit would likely be filed, I dare say not one of them would 
answer “California.” Why on earth does California have any 
connection to, or interest in, this case? And yet that is where the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers chose to file suit, in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California. Why California? I can think of two 
reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit has a reputation as one of the most 
liberal and plaintiff-friendly courts in the nation—especially if you are 
lucky enough to draw the right judges for your panel, as these 
 
 2.  Plaintiffs allege that MBA conspired with the Argentine government to brutally punish 
plant managers whom MBA believed were “union agitators.” Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. 
(Bauman III), 644 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 3.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG (Bauman II), 2007 WL 486389, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
12, 2007), rev’d, 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 4.  See PHIL OCHS, Cops of the World, on PHIL OCHS IN CONCERT (Elektra 1966).  
 5.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005) 
(Bauman I). 
 6.  DaimlerChrysler briefly disputed the validity of the service but ultimately withdrew its 
objection to service in Michigan. Bauman III, 644 F.3d at 913. 
 7.  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 8.  106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 9.  Both federal statutes, of course, buy into the “U.S. as world arbiter” mentality, but this 
Essay is not about congressional overreaching so we shall take the statutes as we find them. 
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plaintiffs did10—and the plaintiffs in this case needed all the help they 
could get because of the many potential hurdles to their claims. 
Second, in addition to their federal claims, the plaintiffs also brought 
claims for wrongful death and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress under the laws of Argentina and California. On several key 
issues, California’s law on wrongful death is more plaintiff-friendly 
than that of Michigan.11 In short, the plaintiffs’ lawyers filed in 
California rather than in Michigan because they thought they had a 
better chance of winning there. Forum shopping, pure and simple. 
Plaintiffs, however, are allowed to forum shop as long as the 
court they choose has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The 
district court held that it did not have jurisdiction over 
DaimlerChrysler, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The parties and both 
courts agreed that the only possible type of personal jurisdiction over 
DaimlerChrysler is general jurisdiction, because the suit is entirely 
unrelated to DaimlerChrysler’s contacts with California. Thus, the 
question is whether DaimlerChrysler has “continuous and systematic” 
contacts with California.12 
On the surface, it appears that DaimlerChrysler has no 
contacts with California. It is neither incorporated nor headquartered 
there. It has no sales force, no dealerships, and no manufacturing or 
other facilities in the state. But another wholly owned subsidiary, 
Mercedes-Benz USA (“MBUSA”), does have contacts with California: 
although it is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of 
business in New Jersey, it has a regional office, a vehicle preparation 
center, and a “Classic Center” in California.13 DaimlerChrysler 
conceded that California courts—state and federal—would have 
general jurisdiction over MBUSA based on these contacts. The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that MBUSA’s contacts should be imputed to its 
 
 10.  The panel consisted of Judges Reinhardt, Schroeder, and Nelson, all Carter appointees. 
For the Ninth Circuit’s liberal and plaintiff-friendly reputation, see for example, John Schwartz, 
‘Liberal’ Reputation Precedes Ninth Circuit Court, N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 2010, at A33; Lee 
Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 312 (2007). 
 11.  For wrongful death actions, California confers broad standing on survivors, while 
Michigan limits standing to the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. See CAL. CIV. 
PRO. CODE § 377.60 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922 (2009). California also generally 
imposes joint liability on multiple defendants in wrongful death actions, while Michigan holds 
defendants only severally liable. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431, 1431.2 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 600.2956 (2009). Michigan allows a defendant to introduce evidence of collateral sources 
to offset defendants’ liability, while California does not. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6303 
(2009); McKinney v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 849, 851 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(declining to “reconstruct the collateral source rule in a way that would reduce respondents’ 
damages”).  
 12.  See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 13. Bauman  I, 2005 WL 3157472 at *17. 
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parent, DaimlerChrysler, and thus found personal jurisdiction over 
DaimlerChrysler based on MBUSA’s contacts with California. And 
now the Court apparently must decide whether DaimlerChrysler is 
subject to jurisdiction in California on the basis of its subsidiary’s 
facilities in that state. 
III. WHY THE COURT SHOULD DUCK THE QUESTION 
 What should the Supreme Court do? What it should not do is 
answer the question that the plaintiffs foolishly teed up and the Ninth 
Circuit decided. There is no way to rule on whether MBUSA’s contacts 
with California give general jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler 
without doing great doctrinal damage. 
Affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision has two significant 
problems. First, to affirm would be to abandon essentially all limits on 
general personal jurisdiction. Remember, DaimlerChrysler is the 
parent of two relevant subsidiaries: MBUSA, which has connections to 
California but no connection to the atrocities on which the plaintiffs’ 
claims are based, and MBA, which has connections to the atrocities 
but no connection to California. If this combination of subsidiaries 
means that the parent corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in 
California, then effectively every global corporation will be subject to 
general jurisdiction in the United States for any of its activities 
worldwide—if not in California, then in whatever state(s) its 
subsidiaries do significant business. Affirming the Ninth Circuit is 
therefore likely to lead to an increase in exactly the kind of blatant 
forum-shopping that occurred in this case. 
Second, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling is 
especially problematic because of the interrelationship between 
jurisdiction and liability in this particular case. The plaintiffs are 
imputing the actions of subsidiaries to DaimlerChrysler, often called 
“piercing the corporate veil,” for two different purposes. They argue 
(and the Ninth Circuit held) that MBUSA’s actions should be 
attributed to DaimlerChrysler in order to confer personal jurisdiction 
over DaimlerChrysler in California. But they also must argue that the 
acts of the Argentine subsidiary, MBA, should be attributed to 
DaimlerChrysler for the purpose of imposing substantive liability. 
DaimlerChrysler did not itself commit any tortious acts in Argentina, 
and DaimlerChrysler thus bears no liability for the acts complained of 
unless the corporate veil between DaimlerChrysler and MBA is 
pierced. 
The problem here is that the standard for piercing the 
corporate veil in the context of liability is quite strict, analogous to the 
jurisdictional test urged on the Ninth Circuit by both the defendant 
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and the judges dissenting from a denial of rehearing en banc.14 In the 
words of one commentator, piercing the corporate veil to impose 
liability on a parent because of the acts of its independent subsidiary 
conventionally requires both “particularly intrusive exercise of control 
over the decision-making processes of a subsidiary” and some other 
evidence of non-separateness such as a lack of compliance with 
corporate formalities or administrative and financial 
interdependence.15 The Supreme Court has agreed that “[i]t is a 
general principle of corporate law ‘deeply ingrained in our economic 
and legal systems’ that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the 
acts of its subsidiaries.”16 Indeed, many courts have explicitly held 
that it is more difficult to pierce the veil in the context of substantive 
liability than in the context of jurisdiction.17 
In Bauman, then, the plaintiffs cannot win unless they satisfy 
the strictest standard for piercing the corporate veil. It is futile to 
confer jurisdiction on the basis of a more lenient standard because the 
stricter standard will end up applying anyway.18 Affirming the Ninth 
Circuit would thus muddy—and arguably worsen—jurisdictional 
doctrines without providing substantive justice to the plaintiffs. It 
would be better to wait to settle the jurisdictional question in a case in 
which it mattered. For example, imagine that DaimlerChrysler itself 
 
 14.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (Bauman IV), 676 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 15.  Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 360 (1990). This strict test has been adopted by the Supreme Court in some 
statutory contexts. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). It has, of course, also been 
criticized by some commentators. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward 
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (on limited 
liability generally); Note, Enterprise Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate 
Groups, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 195 (2009) (on piercing the corporate veil for parent-subsidiary 
relationships). For the classic defense of limited liability (and thus of strict piercing standards), 
see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 41–44 (1991). In many states, the conventional multi-part requirements exist 
side-by-side with supplementary doctrines allowing piercing on the basis of a single factor. See 
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 12.01 (2d ed. 2005) 
(BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS). Even so, the standards are quite strict, requiring either a 
manifest lack of separate existence or the parent’s use of the subsidiary for fraudulent purposes. 
Id. at §§ 12.02-03. 
 16.  Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61. 
 17.  BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 15, at §§ 14.02, 23.01. 
 18.  I assume that DaimlerChrysler has the same relationship to both these wholly owned 
subsidiaries; there is nothing in the case to indicate otherwise. There is also the complicating 
factor that state law will govern whether the corporate veil is pierced for purposes of liability, 
and there is some evidence that California law may favor piercing more often than the law of 
most other states. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1052 (1991). But the difference is not statistically significant, and the 
“internal affairs” rule may lead to the application of Delaware or German law on piercing in any 
case. Id. at 1051–53. 
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had directly participated in the Dirty War rather than acting, as 
plaintiffs alleged, through its Argentine subsidiary. In such case, the 
jurisdictional test would actually matter, because if a court has 
jurisdiction it would be able to hold DaimlerChrysler directly liable 
without any further piercing of the corporate veil. 
On the other hand, the Court should not reverse the Ninth 
Circuit by holding that the Court of Appeals too easily pierced the 
corporate veil and imputed MBUSA’s contacts with California to 
DaimlerChrysler. Such a ruling would also have deleterious 
consequences, both doctrinal and practical. As a doctrinal matter, 
setting a high bar for piercing the corporate veil across the board—
including in all jurisdictional contexts—continues and entrenches a 
formalist approach to corporate separateness that does not reflect 
either the reality or the diversity of corporate forms and that allows 
corporations to externalize costs.19 As a practical matter, it would 
allow a corporation to avoid jurisdiction in most (or all) states by the 
simple expedient of turning its various divisions into separate 
corporate subsidiaries. Consider the ways corporations structure their 
subsidiaries to avoid state and federal taxes:20 Do we really want to 
expand those opportunities to the jurisdictional context? 
The imputation question must be answered eventually, but it 
should be addressed in a more appropriate case: one in which the 
plaintiffs have a real connection to the forum state and the parent 
company can plausibly be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary. 
That is not this case. Deciding a broad, recurring question in the 
context of a unique case is too likely to lead to an answer that is right 
for this case but wrong for the run-of-the mill case. But, if the Court 
answers the question presented to it, the rule announced in this case 
will apply to all cases. 
IV. HOW THE COURT SHOULD DUCK THE QUESTION 
The Court, therefore, is apparently damned if it does and 
damned if it doesn’t. (Although I suspect that some individual Justices 
might find one or the other of the two results appealing.) But there is 
a way out. Indeed, there are several ways to decide the case that 
 
 19.  For cases illustrative of this trend, see, for example, Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61; Janus 
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). I am indebted to Bob 
Thompson for suggesting both the trend and the problems with it. 
 20.  See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-
strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing Apple’s 
efforts to minimize its tax liability). 
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would do less damage and might even do some good by clarifying 
existing doctrine. 
The best option would be to revisit the question of MBUSA’s 
contacts with California, which DaimlerChrysler unwisely conceded 
were sufficient to satisfy the “continuous and systematic” test for 
general jurisdiction. Under current doctrine, it is highly questionable 
that a federal court in California has general personal jurisdiction 
over MBUSA, and the Court could reverse the Ninth Circuit on that 
ground.21 
When the suit was filed—and, indeed, until a month after the 
Ninth Circuit issued its opinion—the law on general jurisdiction was 
at least unclear and possibly in flux. The Supreme Court had decided 
only two cases focusing on general jurisdiction, finding in one that a 
corporation that essentially camped out in Ohio while its 
headquarters in the Philippines were occupied by the Japanese during 
World War II did have sufficient contacts with Ohio to confer general 
jurisdiction in that state,22 and in the other that a corporation that 
purchased helicopters from a Texas supplier, deposited its payments 
into a Texas bank, and occasionally sent personnel to Texas for 
training on the helicopters did not have sufficient contacts with Texas 
for general jurisdiction.23 Neither case gave much guidance as to the 
bulk of situations falling between the two extremes. Faced with a lack 
of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts were in disarray.24 
Some, including notably the Ninth Circuit, had loosened the definition 
of continuous and systematic contacts so far that any company with 
substantial sales in a state was subject to general jurisdiction in that 
state.25 It is thus unsurprising that DaimlerChrysler did not contest 
jurisdiction over MBUSA, especially given the strength of its 
 
 21.  DaimlerChrysler’s concession should not stand in the way of this holding. First, 
DaimlerChrysler probably conceded personal jurisdiction over MBUSA based on then-extant 
Ninth Circuit precedent, which a more recent Supreme Court case has found to be incorrect. See 
text accompanying notes 26–31. Moreover, as long as DaimlerChrysler objected to the exercise of 
general jurisdiction—which it did—nothing should prevent the Supreme Court from agreeing 
with that objection even on reasoning not suggested by DaimlerChrysler. 
 22.  Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 23.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 24.  See Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws 357–58 (4th ed. 2004) (documenting lower 
court division). 
 25.  See Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated as moot, 
398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that despite absence of any offices or agents in 
California, L.L. Bean was subject to general jurisdiction there because California sales 
constituted 6% of its business); accord Gorman v. Ameritrade, 293 F.3d 506 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-CeCo Corp., 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996); Michigan Nat’l Bank v. 
Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1989); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 818 F.2d 370 
(5th Cir. 1987).  
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argument that MBUSA’s contacts with California should not suffice to 
confer general jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler itself. 
But just over a month after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Bauman, the Supreme Court issued its third opinion on general 
jurisdiction in seventy years. In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown,26 a unanimous Court clarified the requirements for 
general jurisdiction, interpreting the earlier cases as setting a high 
bar. A corporation has “continuous and systematic” contacts with a 
state, the Court said, only in a state in which “the corporation is fairly 
regarded as at home,” equivalent to an individual’s domicile.27 It cited 
approvingly an article that it described as “identifying domicile, place 
of incorporation, and principal place of business as ‘paradig[m]’ bases 
for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”28 A year before Goodyear, 
Hertz Corp. v. Friend29 had defined “principal place of business” for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction as the corporation’s “nerve center [], 
typically . . . [its] headquarters.”30 Putting the two cases together 
suggests that MBUSA’s maintenance of three facilities in California, 
none of them headquarters or a nerve center, was not sufficient to 
constitute continuous and systematic contacts. 
A Supreme Court holding that MBUSA’s contacts with 
California did not give rise to general jurisdiction under Goodyear 
would provide two benefits. First, it would obviate the need to decide 
the difficult question of whether MBUSA’s activities in California 
should be imputed to DaimlerChrysler. If California cannot exercise 
general jurisdiction over MBUSA, then it cannot derivatively exercise 
general jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler regardless of whether 
MBUSA’s contacts can be imputed to DaimlerChrysler. Second, it 
would serve to clarify the meaning of “continuous and systematic,” 
limiting general jurisdiction to the states in which a corporation is 
incorporated or has enough headquarters-like operations to count as a 
principal place of business.31 Lower courts are already pushing the 
envelope after Goodyear, distinguishing Goodyear and finding general 
personal jurisdiction on the basis of sales (or salespeople) alone 
 
 26.  131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 27.  Id. at 2853–54. 
 28.  Id. at 2854 (citing Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 721, 728 (1988)). 
 29.  130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). 
 30.  Id. at 1186. 
 31.  As I suggest infra, text accompanying notes 38–39, although the Court has reasonably 
interpreted § 1332 as dictating that a corporation has only a single principal place of business for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, there is no reason why a corporation cannot have more than 
one principal place of business in which it feels “at home” for purposes of personal jurisdiction. 
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without any other physical presence, let alone headquarters.32 If 
Goodyear was meant to rein in the lower courts, it isn’t working; 
Bauman offers an opportunity for the Court to reiterate the 
narrowness of general jurisdiction. Unlike a determination of whether 
to impute MBUSA’s contacts to DaimlerChrysler, therefore, holding 
that the district court lacked general jurisdiction over MBUSA would 
serve to improve rather than worsen personal jurisdiction doctrines. 
Another good option would be to hold that regardless of 
whether DaimlerChrysler has sufficient contacts with California, it 
would be unreasonable for a California court to exercise jurisdiction 
over it. It is black-letter law that a court has personal jurisdiction only 
if the defendant has the requisite contacts with the forum state and 
the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.33 The Court has identified 
five factors relevant to the determination of reasonableness: the 
burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s interest, the forum state’s 
interest, the “interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the 
most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the “shared interest of 
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.”34 Neither California nor the plaintiffs have any legitimate 
interest in litigating this dispute in California rather than in 
Michigan, even assuming that the plaintiffs have a legitimate interest 
in litigating in the United States rather than in Argentina or 
Germany. Nor is litigating in California likely to be efficient. Indeed, 
eight Justices have previously found the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction unreasonable in a dispute between two foreign parties 
that arose out of an event in the forum state.35 The exercise of general 
jurisdiction in Bauman has to be even less reasonable, as it involves a 
 
 32.  See, e.g., J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Abbott Labs. Inc., 2013 WL 452807 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 6, 
2013); Ashbury Int’l Group v. Cadex Defence, Inc., 2012 WL 4325183 (W.D. Va., Sept. 20, 2012); 
McFadden v. Fuyao N. America Inc., 2012 WL 1230046 (E.D. Mich., Apr. 12, 2012). 
 33.  More accurately, it is black-letter law that reasonableness is required for specific 
jurisdiction, and it is assumed by courts and scholars that it is also required for general 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–116 
(1987) (in specific jurisdiction context, eight Justices agreed on dismissal because exercise of 
jurisdiction was unreasonable, despite disagreement about whether minimum contacts existed); 
Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Nav. Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Although neither 
the Supreme Court nor this circuit has explicitly engaged in a separate reasonableness inquiry 
in a general jurisdiction case, Asahi’s interpretation of International Shoe as entailing separate 
contacts and reasonableness inquiries is not limited to the specific jurisdiction context but 
applies to all determinations of personal jurisdiction.”); Johnston v. Multidata Systems Int’l 
Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven if [defendant] had continuous and systematic 
contacts with Texas . . ., traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice would be violated 
if we exercised jurisdiction over it in this case.”). 
 34.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Asahi, 480 U.S. at 
113. 
 35.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–16. 
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suit by foreign plaintiffs challenging the actions on foreign soil of a 
foreign defendant (with much stronger ties to a different U.S. state). 
Like the first option, holding that the exercise of jurisdiction over 
DaimlerChrysler is unreasonable would both avoid the difficult 
question of imputation and clarify the contours of the doctrinal 
reasonableness requirement. 
There is also a third option, which, while not as good as the 
first two, would be better than directly confronting the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding. Recall that the plaintiffs’ claims arise under two federal 
statutes and two non-federal sources of law. Because the federal 
statutes plainly confer federal-question jurisdiction and the other 
claims are sufficiently related to the federal claims to fall within 
supplemental jurisdiction, at the time this case was filed—and at the 
time it was decided by the Ninth Circuit—the district court 
undoubtedly had subject matter jurisdiction. But things have changed 
dramatically since the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. In Mohamad v. 
Palestinian Authority,36 the Court held that only a natural person can 
be held liable under the Torture Victims Protection Act. And in Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company,37 the Court held that the Alien 
Tort Statute does not reach most acts outside the territory of the 
United States. Both federal claims should therefore be dismissed, 
leaving only the state claims. 
Once the Court concludes that the federal claims are no longer 
viable, it should remand to allow the district court to determine 
whether to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining 
state claims. There is, of course, no federal-question jurisdiction over 
the state claims. There is almost certainly no diversity jurisdiction. All 
of the plaintiffs are citizens of foreign nations. DaimlerChrysler’s 
citizenship is, under § 1332(c), its place of incorporation (Germany) 
and its principal place of business.38 Although a corporation might 
conceivably have more than one “nerve center” where it can be 
considered “at home” for purposes of general personal jurisdiction, it 
can only have one principal place of business for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction.39 Whether or not it is at home in Michigan, then, its 
principal place of business under § 1332 is almost surely in Germany 
where it has its primary headquarters. Thus, none of the parties are 
citizens of any state. Section 1332 does not confer jurisdiction over 
 
 36.  132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). 
 37.  133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 38.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2013). 
 39.  Hertz, supra note 26, at 1192 –94. 
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suits entirely among foreign parties—at least one party must be a 
citizen of one of the United States.40 
That leaves only the possibility of supplemental jurisdiction 
under § 1367.41 The district court had supplemental jurisdiction over 
the state claims at the time the suit was filed, because they arose out 
of the same set of events as did the federal claims.42 But if all the 
federal claims are dismissed, § 1367(c)(3) explicitly permits the 
district court to decline to exercise that jurisdiction. That 
discretionary decision must be left to the district court; neither the 
Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals should make the initial 
determination of whether to decline the exercise of jurisdiction under 
§ 1367(c)(3).43 
Like the first two options, a remand for determination of 
subject matter jurisdiction avoids unnecessary damage to personal-
jurisdiction doctrines. It also allows the district court to exercise its 
discretion rather than mechanically applying mandatory jurisdictional 
rules, which seems especially appropriate in a case that has broad 
implications not only for constitutional doctrine but also for U.S. 
foreign relations. Unlike the first two options, however, it does not 
necessarily avoid the need to confront the imputation question in this 
case eventually. That is why it is the third-best choice, but still better 
 
 40.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2013).  
 41.  28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2013). 
 42.  28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2013). 
 43.  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2013) (“the district court may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction . . . ”) (emphasis added); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 
(1966) (pendent or supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right”). 
Although a remand for a determination of subject matter jurisdiction will not necessarily obviate 
the need to decide personal jurisdiction at some point—if the court decides not to decline 
jurisdiction, DaimlerChrysler’s objection to personal jurisdiction will still stand—remanding 
nevertheless makes good sense under the circumstances. A court needs both subject matter 
jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the parties in order to act, but subject matter jurisdiction is the 
more fundamental of the two. It cannot be waived, and a case must be dismissed at any point in 
the proceedings, up to and including at the Supreme Court, if it is discovered that subject matter 
jurisdiction is lacking. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 
U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (“Neither party has questioned [subject matter] jurisdiction, but it is the 
duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdiction . . . is not exceeded.”); see also Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction 
be established as a threshold matter . . . is ‘inflexible and without exception.’ ”). The only 
exception to the rule is that a court may—but need not—dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
without examining its subject matter jurisdiction first. Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 
574 (1999). That exception does not apply here, because it is limited to circumstances in which “a 
district court has before it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue . . . and the alleged defect 
in subject matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question.” Id. at 588. In Bauman, the 
situation is exactly the reverse: the subject matter jurisdiction issue is straightforward and the 
personal jurisdiction issues are difficult and novel. Thus, the district court should decide whether 
to exercise subject matter jurisdiction before deciding whether it has personal jurisdiction. 
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than answering the question in circumstances that almost guarantee 
a wrong answer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The lawyers and lower-court judges in this case had the best of 
intentions. But their overzealous pursuit of justice blinded them to 
doctrinal realities and put this bad case before the Supreme Court. 
One can only hope that enough Justices recognize the dangers and 
exercise their discretion by deciding the case without answering the 
Ninth Circuit’s provocative question. 
 
